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Hybrid Allocation Mechanisms for Publicly Provided Goods

Abstract:
Motivated by efficiency and equity concerns, public resource managers have increasingly
utilized hybrid allocation mechanisms that combine features of commonly used price (e.g.,
auction) and non-price (e.g., lottery) mechanisms. This study serves as an initial investigation of
these hybrid mechanisms, exploring theoretically and experimentally how the opportunity to
obtain a homogeneous good in a subsequent lottery affects Nash equilibrium bids in
discriminative and uniform price auctions. The lottery imposes an opportunity cost to winning
the auction, systematically reducing equilibrium auction bids. In contrast to the uniform price
auction, equilibrium bids in the uniform price hybrid mechanism vary with bidder risk
preferences. Experimental evidence suggests that the presence of the lottery and risk attitudes
(elicited through a preceding experiment) impact auction bids in the directions predicted by
theory. Finally, we find that theoretically and experimentally, the subsequent lottery does not
compromise the efficiency of the auction in the hybrid mechanisms.

JEL classification: D44; D81; C91; H40
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I.

Introduction
That the price mechanism is able to achieve an efficient allocation of resources is well

known.1 However, non-price mechanisms commonly relied upon to allocate publicly provided
goods including health care, public housing, recreational opportunities, among other goods, fail
to achieve efficiency. Some have argued that the use of such non-price mechanisms reflects
concerns for fairness (see Aubert [1959], Goodwin [1992], Hofstee [1990]). Taylor et al. [2003]
argue a lottery, one such non-price mechanism, is “usually employed to resolve allocation
problems in order to reflect a spirit of fairness and equality, since everyone has an equal chance
to win, regardless of whatever characteristics or qualities one may possess” (p. 1316).2 While the
efficiency properties of specific mechanisms within the class of non-price mechanisms may vary
(see Taylor et al. [2003]), in general the choice between a price and a non-price mechanism
implies a tradeoff between efficiency and equity. Historical and continued current use of nonprice mechanisms for some publicly provided goods suggests that policy actions may be at least
partially driven by some other objective. Even if resource managers would otherwise favor
moving to a pure price system to achieve efficiency and/or maximize revenue, they may be
reluctant or unable to do so due to political constraints such as public disapproval.3
Recently implemented and proposed mechanisms, which we label “hybrid mechanisms,”
combine features of price and non-price mechanisms. The goods for which hybrid mechanisms
have either been used or proposed tend to be (i) publicly provided, and (ii) goods that have
historically been allocated through the exclusive use of non-price rationing devices such as
1

Carlton [1991] states “Microeconomics is concerned with the efficient allocation of goods. It is typical for
economists to focus on the price system as the mechanism used to achieve this efficient allocation. An impersonal
auction system is often in the back of most economists' minds when they think of efficient resource allocation.”
2
Boyce [1994] challenges the view that the use of lotteries stems primarily from their desirable equity properties.
He proposes a model in which a small proportion of proceeds from the allocation are redistributed to the population.
He shows that in this setting, a lottery is preferred to an auction.
3
For example, Kahneman et al. [1986] found that people preferred queues to lotteries to auctions among
mechanisms used to allocate concert tickets.
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lottery or queue. Revenue generation and increased efficiency are commonly cited motives for
moving or proposing a move from a non-price system to a hybrid system.
The mechanism used to allocate rights of passage through the Panama Canal to ships is
one example of a hybrid mechanism. Of the approximately 38 ships that pass through the Canal
each day, 24 slots are reserved in advance, one slot is distributed in an auction, and the remaining
rights of passage are allocated to ships in the queue [Schnexnayder, 2007]. A second example
stems from the recent debates surrounding U.S. immigration policy reforms. Current
immigration policy distributes immigration visas through non-price mechanisms including
lottery, queue, and preference by family status and special skills. There is ongoing debate over
how to modify the current system (see Simon [1986, 1987] and Becker [1987] for early
discussions), and recent proposals favor a hybrid mechanism over a move to a pure price system.
Gross and MacLaury [2001] propose allocating Specialty Worker visas (H-1B), over and above
the current allotment, via auction during periods of excess demand. Posner [2005] discusses
using hybrid mechanisms for visas that grant permanent resident status.
Two additional examples relate to the allocation of recreational opportunities. First,
perhaps in response to declining budgets, several states have used hybrid mechanisms to
distribute big game hunting permits, a setting in which there is often a very small number of
permits relative to the number of interested parties. Permits, as few as a single permit, are
initially offered for sale through a central auction with the remaining permits allocated via a
lottery (sometimes with a nominal entry fee in one or both).4 Rafting permits for the Colorado
River in the Grand Canyon are also allocated using a system that effectively combines a price

4

See Nguyen et al. [2007] for a brief discussion of Maine’s experience with moose hunting permit auctions. Some
other U.S. states and Canadian provinces rely on non-profit foundations, such as the Foundation for North American
Wild Sheep (www.fnaws.org), to hold auctions for as few as a single hunting permit while the local wildlife agency
continues to manage allocation of the majority of permits through the lottery.
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and non-price mechanism. An individual who wishes to raft this section of the Colorado River
has two options. First, she may enter a lottery to obtain a non-commercial rafting permit.5
Alternatively, she can pay a commercial rafting company to guide her, making use of the
company’s commercial rafting permit to access the river.
The use of hybrid mechanisms has not been restricted to the allocation of homogeneous
goods, such as hunting permits and immigration visas. The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing
Reform Act of 1987 initiated a move from the previous lottery system to a hybrid system in
which all available tracts are initially offered for sale through a sealed-bid first-price auction with
a reserve bid (Haspel [1990]).6 Those tracts not sold via auction (because of lack of bids or bids
that fail to exceed reserve prices) are then offered for sale through a lottery. More recently, the
Alaska Department of Natural Resources [2006] used a similar hybrid mechanism to allocate
state lands to Alaska residents. Other applications include the allocation of vendor spaces (e.g.,
Kobey’s Swap Meet [2006] at the San Diego Sports Arena) and undeveloped housing lots (e.g.,
the “Ocean View Auction and Lottery” sponsored by the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing
Authority in 2003 [PR Newswire, 2003]).
While increasingly implemented in practice, a rigorous examination of the incentive
properties associated with hybrid mechanisms has not yet been undertaken. This is a necessary
first step before one can begin to develop formal theories to explain why such hybrid
mechanisms are employed to allocate goods in some settings while price and non-price
mechanisms continued to be used in other settings. This paper provides first insights for a
specific hybrid system: a fixed number of non-transferable homogeneous units are available for
5

Until October 2006, non-commercial rafting permits were allocated via queue. In 2000, the average wait time for a
non-commercial applicant was 14 years. See www.gcpba.org.
6
Haspel [1990] notes that the adoption of the hybrid or two-tier allocation mechanism was seen as a compromise by
those who advocated using a price mechanism, but such individuals were “pleasantly surprised” at the outcome of
the program.
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allocation, of which a portion are allocated through an auction with the remainder allocated via a
lottery in which auction winners are precluded from participating. In particular, we build upon
the work of Vickrey [1962] and Harris and Raviv [1981] to investigate theoretically how the
opportunity to obtain a homogeneous good in a subsequent lottery affects equilibrium auction
bidding in uniform price and discriminative auctions. Our model of bidder behavior assumes
singleton demands, private values, and homogeneous risk preferences. With risk-neutral agents,
we establish that: (a) hybrid mechanism equilibrium bids are simply the pure auction equilibrium
bids scaled by the probability of losing the lottery; and (b) the addition of the lottery does not
change the familiar revenue equivalence result. With identically risk-averse agents, we are able
to show that, with the addition of the lottery: (c) uniform price auction bids are no longer
independent of risk preferences; and (d) uniform price and discriminative auctions continue to
allocate units to individuals with the highest valuations, i.e., auctions remain efficient.
To complement our theoretical derivations, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments
with induced values to test theoretical predictions. The focus of the experiments is on how the
conditional probability of winning the lottery and risk attitudes affect auction bidding. To
investigate the role of risk attitudes, we include in our econometric analysis a risk measure
elicited through a preceding paired lottery-choice procedure (e.g., Holt and Laury [2002]). This
approach is a departure from previous empirical auction studies where it is common to use
indirect approaches, for example examining risk parameters estimated from structural
econometric models, or by testing for departures from risk-neutral bidding.
We find that the subsequent lottery and risk preferences affect the estimated bid function
in the directions predicted by theory for experimental uniform price and discriminative hybrid
mechanisms. In particular, increasing the conditional probability of winning the lottery (e.g.,

4

allocating more units via lottery, less via auction) decreases auction bids; risk aversion (risk
seeking) increases (decreases) auction bids. These findings have import for the healthy debate
over the role of risk attitudes in experimental auctions (see Kagel [1995]). We find that average
revenue from the uniform price and discriminative hybrids are approximately equivalent.
Finally, the experimental results confirm the theory in that, in the hybrid mechanisms,
auctioned units continue to go to those with the highest valuations. Although the presence of the
lottery in the hybrid mechanisms reduces efficiency relative to the pure auction counterparts, the
inefficiency stems only from the lottery component, not from reduced efficiency in the auction
component. Hence, even if the public sector must allow lotteries for political reasons,
governments would be able to introduce an auction to allocate some units without the fear that
the subsequent lottery allocation of similar items will reduce the efficiency properties of the
auction.

II.

Model
Consider a seller who has S total units (or permits) available for allocation among N > S

potential buyers. Bidders demand at most one unit of the good. Let vi represent the private
monetary value of a unit to bidder i where vi is independently drawn from the distribution
characterized by density function g and cumulative distribution function G with support [0, v ] .
The allocation proceeds as follows. First, the seller allocates Q < S units via auction. Then, the
seller allocates the remaining S-Q units via lottery among the N-Q remaining buyers as auction
winners are ineligible for participation in the lottery. Therefore, the probability of winning the
subsequent lottery is

S −Q
∈ (0,1) .
N −Q

5

Assume that there are neither entry fees for either the auction or lottery nor a user fee for
lottery or auction winners. We consider two common multiple unit auction formats, the uniform
price and discriminative auctions, both defined explicitly below. Assuming homogenous risk
preferences, let bij ,k = b j ,k (vi ) represent the bid function for bidder i for mechanism j when all
bidders have risk preferences k.7 Let π i (b j ,k (vi )) = vi represent its inverse. For each auction
format, we first examine how the opportunity to obtain a unit through the hybrid mechanism
affects the equilibrium bid function under risk neutrality and risk aversion. Following this
discussion, we examine auction revenues.

A.

Hybrid mechanism with uniform price auction
The uniform price auction is the multiple unit counterpart of the second-price auction.

We consider a uniform price auction in which all winners pay a price equal to the first rejected
bid. Harris and Raviv [1981] prove that the familiar value revelation result for second-price
auctions, where it is optimal to bid one’s value regardless of risk preferences, extends to the
uniform price auction. We show that a related result holds for the uniform price hybrid.
However, the addition of a subsequent lottery in this setting serves as an additional (opportunity)
cost to winning the auction, which causes bidder i to shade her bid relative to her monetary
value, vi . In the uniform price hybrid, bidder i submits a bid equal to her benefit of winning the
auction (as in the pure uniform price auction) but that benefit is now lower than vi as a result of
the subsequent lottery. For the risk-neutral case, Proposition 1 shows that bidders scale their bids
exactly by the probability of losing the lottery.
Proposition 1: When bidders are risk neutral, the Nash equilibrium bid function for bidder i who
7

When we allow for risk aversion, we assume all bidders are identically risk averse. The absence of a subscript
following the comma indicates that the result holds whether all bidders are risk neutral or all bidders are identically
risk averse.
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faces a hybrid allocation mechanism with a uniform price auction (denoted UH for uniform price
hybrid) is given by

⎛
⎛
S −Q ⎞
S −Q ⎞
⎟⎟bU (vi )
⎟⎟vi = ⎜⎜1 −
bUH , N (vi ) = ⎜⎜1 −
N
Q
N
Q
−
−
⎠
⎝
⎠
⎝

(1)

⎛
S −Q ⎞
⎟⎟ represents the probability of losing the lottery and bU (⋅) denotes the Nash
where ⎜⎜1 −
⎝ N −Q⎠
equilibrium bid in the uniform price auction.
Proof: See appendix.
Whereas equilibrium bids in the uniform price auction are independent of bidders’ risk
preferences, risk preferences do affect equilibrium bids in the uniform price hybrid.8 The
intuition behind this result is as follows. In a pure uniform price auction setting, where a riskneutral bidder bids her value, there is no incentive for a risk-averse agent to increase her bid
above her value. Doing so affects the probability of winning but does not affect the payoffs upon
winning (at least over the range for which she would want to win) because the price is
independent of her bid. However, in the uniform price hybrid, risk aversion implies a lower
opportunity cost of winning the auction (relative to risk neutrality) and therefore an incentive to
bid more. This occurs because increasing the probability of winning the auction, by bidding
more, decreases the probability of winning the lottery given that only non-auction winners enter
the lottery. Although the equilibrium bid under risk aversion exceeds that under risk neutrality in
the uniform price hybrid, the risk averse bidder continues to bid less than she would in the
absence of the lottery. Proposition 2 addresses these results.
Proposition 2: bUH , N (vi ) < bUH , A (vi ) < bU (vi ) = vi ∀vi > 0 where bUH , A (vi ) ( bUH , N (vi ) ) denotes the

8

This result is consistent with Nash equilibrium bidding in a second-price auction for risky prizes (see Neilson
[1994]).
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equilibrium bid function for risk averse (neutral) bidder i facing the uniform price hybrid and

bU (vi ) = vi represents the equilibrium bid function for bidder i facing the pure uniform price
auction. The first inequality holds weakly for weak risk aversion.
Proof:
Consider the second inequality first. For the proof, we make use of the following two
expressions, which hold in equilibrium for the uniform price auction and uniform price hybrid
respectively:

U (vi − bU ) = U (0 )

(2)

U (vi − bUH , A ) = pU (vi ) + (1 − p )U (0)

(3)

where U ′(⋅) > 0, U ′′(⋅) < 0 . Expression (2) implicitly defines the equilibrium bid function for a
bidder in a uniform price auction. To see this, let EU (bU ) ≡ EU (bU (vi )) represent the expected
utility from bidding bU ≡ bU (vi ) in the uniform price auction:
bU

(

) ()

bU

()

bU

(

)()

bU

()

EU (bU ) = ∫ U vi − bˆ dH bˆ + ∫ U (0 )dH bˆ = ∫ U vi − bˆ h bˆ dbˆ − ∫ U (0)h bˆ dbˆ
0

bU

0

bU

where H (⋅) denotes the distribution of the first rejected bid and bU represents the highest bid in
the uniform price auction. The optimal bid for an expected utility maximizer solves the following
(see for example Neilson [1994], equation (2), p. 139):

d
EU (bU ) = 0 ⇔ U (vi − bU )h(bU ) − U (0)h(bU ) = 0 ,
dbU
which reduces to expression (2).
Expression (3) implicitly defines the equilibrium bid function for a bidder in the uniform price
hybrid. Expression (3) also defines the participation constraint for the uniform price hybrid,
which we assume holds for all bidders. That is, there exists a positive bid, denoted bUH , A , such
8

that bidder i is indifferent between winning the auction and paying bUH , A , and taking part in the
lottery. For certain parameter values, the value of bUH , A for which expression (3) holds is
negative. Under these conditions, the bidder requires compensation for submitting a nonnegative bid in the auction and thus the participation constraint does not hold. To derive
expression (3), note that the expected utility from bidding bUH , A (vi ) ≡ bUH , A in the uniform price
hybrid is given by:
bUH , A

(

) ( ) ∫ [(1 − p )U (v ) + pU (0)]dH (bˆ)

EU (bUH , A ) = ∫ U vi − bˆ dH bˆ +
0

bUH , A

=

(

)()

∫ U vi − bˆ h bˆ dbˆ −
0

bUH , A

i

bUH , A

∫ [(1 − p )U (v ) + pU (0)]h(bˆ)dbˆ

bUH , A

i

bUH , A

where bUH represents the highest bid in the uniform price hybrid. Expression (3) follows from
d
EU (bUH , A ) = 0 as above. Given (2) and (3), for p ∈ (0,1) ,
dbUH , A

U (vi − bU ) = U (0) < pU (vi ) + (1 − p )U (0) = U (vi − bUH , A ) . With U increasing, vi − bU < vi − bUH , A ,
which yields the result.
To prove the first inequality, note that by Jensen’s inequality
U (vi − bUH , A ) < U ( p ⋅ vi + (1 − p ) ⋅ 0)

(4)

which because U is increasing implies the following:
vi − bUH , A < p ⋅ vi + (1 − p ) ⋅ 0 .

(5)

The right hand side of equation (5) is equal to U (vi − bUH , N ) = vi − bUH , N . Substitution yields the
result that bUH ,N (vi ) < bUH ,A (vi ) ∀vi > 0 .
In contrast to the pure uniform price auction, Proposition 2 suggests that the addition of
the lottery causes risk-averse bidders in the uniform price hybrid to shade their bids below their
9

values. The lottery in effect changes the auction from one in which each bidder has probabilities
of winning certain values, U (vi − bi ) , if she wins the auction or U (0 ) if not, to one in which each
bidder has a chance of winning a certain value, U (vi − bi ) , or winning an uncertain value
pU (vi ) + (1 − p )U (0) > U (0 ) for p ∈ (0,1) . Because the lottery makes the alternative to winning

the auction more desirable, it reduces the benefits of winning a unit of the good in the auction.
As expected, the reduction is less pronounced for risk-averse bidders as they are willing to pay a
premium to avoid the risk associated with playing the lottery.
B.

Hybrid mechanism with discriminative auction

A second auction format available to the seller is the discriminative auction, the multiple
unit counterpart of the first-price auction where winners pay prices equal to their respective bids.
Harris and Raviv [1981] derive the equilibrium bid function for the discriminative auction. We
adapt the Harris and Raviv model to describe the problem faced by a bidder in the hybrid
mechanism with a discriminative auction. Here, bidder i wins the auction if at least N − Q
bidders have values less than π i (bDH (vi )) where the subscript DH denotes the discriminative
hybrid mechanism. The probability of this event is equal to the probability distribution of the

(N − Q )th

order statistic for a random sample of size N − 1 drawn from G evaluated at

π (b ) ≡ π i (bDH (vi )) given by:
F (π (b )) =

π (b )
(N − 1)!
[G (v )]N −Q−1[1 − G(v )]Q−1 g (v )dv .
∫
(N − Q − 1)!(Q − 1)! 0

(7)

If bidder i wins the discriminative auction then her payoff is U (vi − bi ) where
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U ′(⋅) > 0, U ′′(⋅) ≤ 0 .9 Otherwise, she has a second opportunity to obtain a unit through the lottery.

Therefore, bidder i chooses her bid, bDH , to maximize her expected utility equal to:
⎧S −Q
⎫
⎡
S −Q ⎤
F (π (bDH (vi )))U (vi − bDH (vi )) + [1 − F (π (bDH (vi )))]⎨
U (vi ) + ⎢1 −
U (0 )⎬ (8)
⎥
⎣ N − Q⎦
⎩N − Q
⎭

where U (0) represents utility if the individual does not obtain a unit in either the auction or
lottery. As in the discriminative auction, the equilibrium bid function in the discriminative hybrid
varies with risk preferences. We begin in Proposition 3 with the assumption of risk neutrality,
where, analogous to the uniform price hybrid case, the optimal bidding strategy entails scaling
the equilibrium bid in the pure auction setting by the probability of losing the lottery.
Proposition 3: With risk neutral bidders, the Nash equilibrium bid function for bidder i who faces
a discriminative hybrid mechanism is
v

⎛
⎛
S −Q ⎞ 1 i
S −Q ⎞
⎟bD , N (vi ) .
⎟⎟
⎜
(
)
bDH , N (vi ) = ⎜⎜1 −
xf
x
dx
1
=
−
⎜
N − Q ⎠ F (vi ) ∫0
N − Q ⎟⎠
⎝
⎝

(9)

Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 4 below shows that a similar result holds under risk aversion: the presence of
the lottery causes risk-averse bidders to shade their bids in the discriminative hybrid relative to
their equilibrium bid in an analogous discriminative auction. Before proceeding to the
proposition, we briefly discuss the intuition behind the proof, which relies on the observation that
i’s bid in the uniform price hybrid under risk aversion is the amount she values the item being
auctioned given the subsequent lottery. Bidder i, whose value of winning a unit of the good in

the pure auction is given by vi , values winning a unit of the good in the auction component of

We assume U ′′ = 0 and U ′′ < 0 characterize risk neutral and risk averse bidders respectively. Haris and Raviv
[1981] also assume U (0) = 0 . Later in our analysis, we make a similar assumption. However, the assumption is
unnecessary at this point.
9
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the hybrid setting at bUH , A (vi ) . Therefore, the discriminative hybrid under risk aversion is
comparable to a discriminative auction under risk aversion where the distribution of bidder
values has changed. As a result, if we replace vi in bD , A (vi ) with bUH , A (vi ) we obtain an
expression that characterizes the equilibrium bid function for the discriminative hybrid under risk
aversion, bDH , A (vi ) .
Proposition 4: bDH , A (vi ) < bD , A (vi )
Proof:
In the uniform price auction, the Nash equilibrium bid for risk averse bidder i, denoted bU , A (vi ) ,
is equal to her value for a unit of the good being auctioned or vi (Harris and Raviv [1981]). In
the uniform price hybrid, the Nash equilibrium bid for bidder i, denoted bUH , A (vi ) is equal to her
value for a unit of the good being auctioned given the subsequent lottery. Therefore, to obtain an
expression that characterizes the equilibrium bid function for the discriminative hybrid under risk
aversion, bDH , A (vi ) , substitute bUH , A (vi ) for vi in bD , A (vi ) as follows:
bDH , A (vi ) = bD , A (bUH , A (vi ))

(10)

where by Proposition 2, bUH , A (vi ) < vi . If bUH , A (vi ) and bD , A (vi ) are increasing in vi , then
bDH , A (vi ) = bD , A (bUH , A (vi )) < bD , A (vi ) .

First show bUH , A (vi ) is increasing in vi . In equilibrium for the uniform price hybrid, the
following holds:
U (vi − bUH , A ) = pU (vi ) + (1 − p )U (0)

(11)

with bUH , A > 0 . Implicit differentiation yields:

12

′ , A (vi ) =
bUH

U ′(vi − bUH , A ) − pU ′(vi )
U ′(vi − bUH , A )

(12)

which is positive if U ′(vi − bUH , A ) > pU ′(vi ) . Because vi − bUH , A ≤ vi and by strict concavity of
the utility function, U ′(vi − bUH , A ) > U ′(vi ) > pU ′(vi ) for p < 1 .
Now show bD , A (vi ) is increasing in vi . The first order condition for the equilibrium bid in the
discriminative hybrid is (see appendix equation (A6)):
′ , A (vi ) =
bDH

f (vi ) U (vi − bDH , A ) − [ pU (vi ) + (1 − p )U (0)]
.
F (vi )
U ′(vi − bDH , A )

This expression is positive provided U (vi − bDH , A ) > [ pU (vi ) + (1 − p )U (0)] = U (vi − bUH , A ) where
the equality results from equation (11). Because U is strictly increasing,
vi − bDH , A > vi − bUH , A ⇔ bUH , A > bDH , A . In order to prove the last inequality rewrite bDH , A (vi ) as
bD , A (bUH , A (vi )) . Then bDH , A (vi ) = bD , A (bUH , A (vi )) < bUH , A (vi ) provided bD , A (vi ) < vi which Harris

and Raviv [1981] prove.
Finally, we examine how risk aversion affects the equilibrium bid function under the
discriminative hybrid mechanism by comparing bDH , N (vi ) with bDH , A (vi ) . Recall that in the
uniform price hybrid, risk aversion serves to increase equilibrium bids relative to the risk-neutral
case. Proposition 5 extends Harris and Raviv’s [1981] result that risk aversion increases the
equilibrium bid relative to risk neutrality in the discriminative auction to this hybrid setting.
Proposition 5: Assume U (0) = 0 . Then bDH , A (vi ) > bDH , N (vi ) ∀ vi > 0 .
Proof: See Appendix.
Propositions 1 through 5 suggest two general results. First, the addition of the lottery
component of the hybrid mechanisms reduces bidders’ expected payoffs of winning the auction.

13

As a result, relative to the respective pure auctions, equilibrium bids in the hybrid mechanisms
are lower (given the probability of winning the lottery is strictly less than one and holding risk
preferences constant). Second, as in Harris and Raviv’s [1981] analysis of discriminative
auctions, relative to risk neutrality, risk aversion serves to increase equilibrium bids in both
hybrid settings. Therefore, risk aversion and the subsequent lottery have opposite effects on bids
in the hybrid mechanisms.
The relationships between equilibrium bids suggest differences in expected auction
revenues across mechanisms (and risk preferences). The next subsection addresses these
differences, which are important to the seller who may care about the relationships between
equilibrium bids to the extent that they inform revenue differences.
C.

Auction revenues

In order to compare the actual and expected revenues for the allocation mechanisms, it is
convenient to rank bidders from lowest to highest valuation such that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vN . Our
discussion of hybrid mechanisms adapts Cox et al. [1985] who derive revenue expressions for
discriminative and uniform price auctions. Consider actual revenues first. In the case of the
uniform price hybrid mechanism with risk neutral bidders, actual revenue equals the first bid
rejected times the number of units auctioned, Q. Therefore, actual revenue, R, for the uniform
price hybrid mechanism under risk neutrality is:
⎛
S −Q ⎞
⎟v N −Q
RUH , N = Q⎜⎜1 −
N − Q ⎟⎠
⎝

(13)

⎛
S −Q ⎞
⎟⎟vN −Q represents the first bid rejected. Actual revenue in the discriminative
where ⎜⎜1 −
⎝ N −Q ⎠

hybrid mechanism with risk neutral bidders equals the sum of the highest Q bids or

14

RDH , N =

N

∑b

DH , N
j = N −Q +1

(v )
j

(14)

where bids are ranked from lowest to highest, bDH , N (v1 ) ≤ bDH , N (v2 ) ≤ ... ≤ bDH , N (v N ) . Under risk
aversion, the following equations describe actual auction revenues in the uniform price and
discriminative hybrids respectively:
~
RUH , A = Q ⋅ bUH , A
RDH , A =

N

∑b

DH , A
j = N −Q +1

(15)

(v )
j

(16)

~
where bUH , A denotes the first rejected bid in the uniform price hybrid with risk averse bidders.
In terms of expected auction revenues, Harris and Raviv [1981, pp. 1492-1493] prove
that with risk neutral bidders expected revenue in the discriminative auction equals expected
revenue in the uniform price auction. Proposition 6 extends Harris and Raviv’s revenue
equivalence result to the hybrid mechanisms discussed here.
Proposition 6: E (RUH , N ) = E (RDH , N ) < E (RDH , A ) where E (RUH , N ) and E (RDH , N ) represent
expected revenues for the uniform price hybrid and discriminative hybrid (both with risk neutral
bidders) respectively.
Proof: See appendix.
With risk averse bidders, if the addition of the lottery reduces bids more in the uniform
price setting than in the discriminative setting, expected revenues for the discriminative hybrid
exceed expected revenues for the uniform price hybrid. This is in line with the established result
that a (risk-neutral) seller facing risk averse bidders prefers the discriminative (or first-price)
auction to the uniform price (or second-price) auction. Determining whether this condition is
satisfied requires specifying a utility function and value distribution.
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The experimental design described in section III permits empirical tests of the revenue
hypotheses stated as Proposition 6. Tests of additional revenue hypotheses that stem from the
theory are stated and proved in the appendix.

III.

Experimental Design

The main objective of the experiments is to allow empirical tests of the theoretical
propositions put forth on bidding behavior and revenue generation for hybrid allocation
mechanisms. In all but the uniform price auction, theory suggests interaction effects between
bidding behavior or revenue generation and risk preferences. Thus, how to elicit or otherwise
control for participant risk preferences is a central issue. For first-price auctions, one common
approach is to assume bidders have utility functions that exhibit constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) and use a structural model to estimate the risk aversion parameter directly from bidding
data.10 Risk preferences can thus serve as an additional degree of freedom when estimating bid
functions. If some bidders engage in ad hoc bidding strategies that are spuriously consistent with
risk-averse Nash equilibrium bidding, this confounds estimated risk parameters and conclusions
about the role of risk aversion drawn from them. We are unaware of appropriate structural
methods for the multiple unit auctions we consider (and, likewise, the hybrid allocation
mechanisms).
As an alternative, we directly elicit risk preferences from a separate experiment and use
this to control for risk attitudes in our analysis. The validity of this procedure pivots on whether
risk attitudes are similar across the risk elicitation and allocation mechanism experiments.
Existing research suggests that risk preferences can vary across institutions (e.g., Isaac and James
10

An alternative approach is to induce risk-neutrality (Walker et al. [1990]), but, consistent with the theory, we
wish to allow the possibility that experiment participants are risk averse.
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[2000], Berg et al. [2005]), and over time within the same institution (James [2007]). Further,
James [2007] provides evidence that elicited risk preferences may correlate with confusion. Two
important distinctions of the present study are that our analysis does not rely upon a particular
utility specification to elicit risk preferences and the procedure used to elicit risk attitudes is
reasonably similar to the hybrid mechanisms of interest, e.g., they both involve lotteries.
Risk elicitation is through the lottery-choice procedure of Holt and Laury [2002], with
three important modifications.11 First, to reduce the effects of potential participant confusion,
participants make choices between a certain payoff and a lottery, rather than between two
lotteries. Second, the first and last decision tasks involve a choice between two certain (different)
payoffs. This allows a rudimentary examination of experiment transparency and saliency. Third,
as Holt and Laury [2002] find an interaction between payoff levels and risk, and Rabin’s [2000]
critique casts doubt on whether any utility function (assuming expected utility theory) can
explain behavior over a wide range of gambles, the expected payoff from the risk preference
experiment is on par with the payoff in the allocation experiment for successful bidders. To
equate these expected payoffs we necessarily use a higher experimental $ to US $ exchange rate
in the hybrid allocation experiments relative to the pure auction experiments.
Table 1 presents the eleven decision tasks in the risk preference experiment. As a
reference point, Table 1 also presents the implied range of the coefficient of relative risk
1− r
aversion, r, for the CRRA utility function U ( x) = x

1− r

. Specifically, the bound on r that

corresponds with a particular decision task is for an individual who switches from the certain
payoff (Option A) to an uncertain payoff (Option B) at this gamble. Choices are simultaneous

11

The Holt and Laury [2002] procedure has been widely employed in experimental laboratory settings (see for
example Eckel and Wilson [2004] and Lusk and Coble [2005]) and in field experiments (see for example Harrison et
al. [2005] and Harrison et al. [2004]).
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(without feedback) and one randomly determined decision task determines payoffs. To prevent
spillover effects, announcement of the elicitation experiment outcome occurs after the
completion of the allocation experiment.
The allocation experiment consists of N = 12 players bidding for a “good” in a series of
20 independent, multiple unit pure auction or hybrid allocations (i.e., decision periods). In a
specific session, players face only one of four allocation mechanisms: uniform price auction,
discriminative auction, uniform price hybrid mechanism, and discriminative hybrid mechanism.
Inclusion of the pure uniform price and discriminative auctions serves to establish a baseline
from which to evaluate lottery effects. Prior to each decision period the individual receives an
induced value for a unit of the good, determined by a random draw from a uniform distribution
on the interval [$0.00, $20.00].12 The value distribution is common knowledge, value
realizations are private information, and there is a new independent draw for each player in each
period. Bids are constrained to be within this same range, which is common in the experimental
auction literature (e.g., Cox et al. [1984, 1985]). A minimum bid of zero represents a rational
institutional constraint as it insures nonnegative revenues. The maximum bid imposes a
rationality constraint and partially avoids extreme negative earnings that may stem from
excessive overbidding. This is especially important for initial auctions in an experiment with
inexperienced bidders.
The quantity for sale in each auction, Q, is announced prior to bidding. Q is either 1, 2, or

12

Unfortunately there was a programming error in some initial sessions whereby the values were drawn from the
distribution U ~ [$5.00, $20.00]. We conjecture that this had little or no effect on bidding behavior. In particular, it
would be rather difficult for a bidder to determine that her random draws, and those of other participants, were in
fact coming from a slightly different distribution. This is especially true since players with values between $0 and
$5, if they indeed were generated, given the number of auctioned units in relation to the number of players, would
not be expected to influence observed auction prices. We compared behavior between sessions with and without the
correct distribution employed and found no meaningful differences, in both a statistical and a qualitative sense.
Throughout our analysis, in calculating optimal bids, we assume agents behaved as if they faced the announced
versus the actual value distribution.
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3, with each amount having an equal chance of being selected. Exactly one unit is allocated to
each of the highest Q bidders. Further, for hybrid auctions, the number of available lottery units,
L ≡ S − Q , is announced. L is either 1, 2, or 3 and each amount has an equal chance of being

selected. Only those who do not win the auction are eligible for the lottery, and all entrants have
an equal chance of winning the lottery. The decision period concludes with an announcement to
each player of whether they won the auction (or lottery), earnings, all successful auction bids,
and price(s) paid by all successful bidders. A history of prior auction outcomes is given prior to
each auction.
A.

Equilibrium Bid Functions

To characterize theoretical bidding patterns based on the experimental design we derive
equilibrium bid functions for the hybrid mechanisms in the risk neutral case and using the CRRA
utility function presented above. For the discriminative auction with risk neutral bidders, we rely
on the equilibrium bid function derived by Cox et al. [1984]. Cox et al. [1982] derive the
equilibrium bid function for the discriminative auction when bidders have heterogeneous CRRA
preferences. We adapt their model to the case of homogeneous bidders with CRRA preferences.
We solve for the uniform price hybrid bid functions using equation (3). For the discriminative
hybrid mechanisms under CRRA, we derive equilibrium bid functions with the technique used to
prove Proposition 4. In particular, we note that bDH ,CRRA (v ) = bD ,CRRA (bUH ,CRRA (v )) .
Table 2 presents the equilibrium bid functions for the hybrid mechanisms, and for
purposes of comparison the analogous pure auction bid functions. Further, the characteristics of
the bid functions are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 based on our experimental design parameters.
Figure 1 shows how risk neutral bid functions vary with respect to the probability of winning the
lottery. In particular, for both hybrid mechanisms, Figure 1 presents bid functions for the unit
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combinations {Q=1, L=1}, {2, 2}, and {3, 3}. This spans the range of experiment parameters, for
which the probability of winning the lottery (conditional on being in the lottery) varies from 1/11
(9.1%) to 3/9 (33.3%). As a baseline, the uniform price auction and discriminative auction (Q=1)
are also presented. For the uniform price hybrid, bid functions are linear, and increasing the
probability of winning the auction serves to decrease the slope of the bid function in relation to
value. For the discriminative hybrid, bid functions are linear for Q=1 and concave for Q>1.
Figure 2 shows the effect of risk preferences, using the CRRA utility specification with
Q,L=2 for purposes of illustration. In particular, uniform price and discriminative hybrid bid

functions are presented under moderate risk aversion (r=0.5), risk neutrality, and moderate risk
seeking (r=-0.5). We note that the curvature of the functions is the same as under risk-neutrality.
The functions suggest quite pronounced risk effects. For either mechanism, for example, the
slope of the bid function decreases by about 0.3 between the moderate risk seeking and moderate
risk aversion cases.
B.

Participant Pool and Procedures

In the spring and summer of 2006, 144 students recruited from the general population at
the University of Tennessee participated in one of 12 experimental sessions conducted at the
Experimental Economics Laboratory. There are three sessions (replications) of each mechanism.
Approximately 55% of subjects had previously participated in an economics experiment.
Seventy-five percent of participants have experience bidding in non-experimental auctions (such
as eBay). Average earnings were approximately $20, paid in cash at the conclusion of the
session. Sessions lasted approximately one hour.
Decisions are made via laptop computers. The experiments are programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree [Fischbacher, 2007]. The software collects all decisions and

20

makes all relevant earnings calculations. Written instructions are provided to each participant
and displayed on-screen. The experiment moderator reads instructions aloud, one screen at a
time, and answers any questions prior to proceeding to the next instruction screen. After
instructions for the allocation experiment are read, participants are asked to answer three
questions (using pencil and paper) to assess their understanding of the auction mechanism.
Participants are paid US$0.75 for each correct answer. An experiment coordinator privately
checks answers for each individual, and re-explains procedures and fields questions in the case
of wrong answers. Following the short quiz, there are three unpaid practice rounds. Questions are
encouraged and addressed.
In pilot sessions we observed some considerable overbidding in uniform price auction
treatments. With Q small relative to N, the probability of positive earnings in any auction is
small. As such, it may be quite difficult to overcome a large loss due to gross overbidding in any
period. Even though a participant is likely to learn from such a loss, a few individuals in pilot
experiments engaged in relatively perverse bidding behavior after incurring a large loss, likely
motivated by the remote opportunity to become solvent. To mitigate such behavior, the first time
a participant incurred a large loss (~$5), which occurred for 7 of 144 participants, we refunded
the loss. A coordinator discretely conveyed this information to the participant, and stated that this
was a one-time measure. This procedure was not disclosed prior to the experiment. Upon the
conclusion of the allocation mechanism experiment, a short questionnaire was administered that
included among other things an assessment of how well instructions were understood and prior
participation in auctions.
IV.

Results

A.

Risk Preference Elicitation
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The last column of Table 1 presents risk elicitation experiment results. Overall, the
decision tasks presented in the experiment appear to be well understood by most participants. In
particular, of the two decision tasks involving certain payoffs, just 8 of 144 of participants
choose the option with the lowest payoff in either of these. Consistent with Holt and Laury
[2002] there is a low incidence of apparent preference reversals, as only 19 of 144 switched from
Option A to B and then back to A.13
Excluding the two choices between certain payoffs, the mean and median number of safe
choices (Option A) selected are 5.9 and 6, respectively. Referring to Table 1, this suggests that
the representative individual chooses Option A for decision tasks 1 through 7, and then chooses
Option B for the remaining tasks. About 16%, 23%, and 61% of participants can be characterized
as risk loving, risk neutral and risk averse, respectively. We use the number of safe choices to
construct a measure of risk attitude in the analysis that follows.
B.

Bidding Behavior

The functional form and included model covariates for the econometric bid model are
motivated by the equilibrium bid functions described in III.A. and illustrated in the Figures, with
the effects of the lottery measured relative to the corresponding pure auction treatment. For the
uniform price auction, the specification is simply the auction bid as a linear function of an
intercept and induced value
Bid ij = α + β * Valueij + ε ij

(17)

where ε ij is a random error term corresponding with individual i in allocation period j. The
equilibrium bid function (Table 2) is exactly recovered when α=0 and β=1. The probability of

13

In the analysis that follows, for these individuals with preference reversals, as an approximation we use the total
number of safe choices indicated. We note that treating responses in this manner, or omitting them completely,
makes no real difference in this analysis.
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⎛ S −Q ⎞
⎟⎟ , which
winning the lottery is included as an interaction term with value, Valueij * ⎜⎜
⎝ N −Q⎠

allows the slope of the bid function to vary with this probability. Further, the slope of the
estimated bid function varies by risk attitude through inclusion of an interaction between an
elicited risk preference measure with induced value, Valueij * Risk ij . The risk measure is simply
the number of safe choices (excluding choices between certain outcomes) selected in the risk
elicitation experiment minus five. This gives the risk measure a value of zero for risk neutrality
and larger positive (negative) values for higher degrees of risk aversion (seeking). Further, this is
consistent with the theory that suggests no risk effect for risk neutrality, and opposite effects for
risk seekers and averters.14 The intercept varies across uniform price auction and uniform price
hybrid treatments as, for instance, under certain conditions uniform price hybrid participants may
have negative optimal bids. The estimable bid function for the uniform price hybrid is thus
⎛ S −Q ⎞
⎟⎟ + γ * Valueij * Risk ij + ε ij
Bid ij = α + β * Valueij + λ * Valueij * ⎜⎜
⎝ N −Q ⎠

(18)

The risk neutral equilibrium bid function is exactly recovered with α=0, β=1, λ=-1, and γ=0.
The functional form and included covariates are similar for the case of the discriminative
auction and hybrid. The main difference is that, in contrast to the uniform price auction, both the
number of auction units and risk preferences affect discriminative auction bidding. Although for
Q>1 the equilibrium bid function is nonlinear, the Figures suggest that the curvature is slight and

that a linear approximation is reasonable. The econometric specification has the discriminative
auction bids as a linear function of an intercept, induced value, an interaction between induced
value and the number of units, and an interaction between induced value and the risk measure.
14

To make our bid and revenue analyses consistent under our theoretical assumption of homogeneous risk
preferences, we assume that bidder i perceives all other bidders as having risk preferences identical to her own. This
is a palatable assumption given that participants have no clear signals on the distribution of group risk preferences.
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For the discriminative hybrid, we include two additional interaction terms, a risk-value
interaction term and an interaction between induced value and the probability of winning the
lottery. That is to say, the estimable bid function for the discriminative hybrid has identical form
to equation (18) with the inclusion of a value-auction unit interaction, θ * Valueij * Q .
Recall that auction bids are constrained to be between the minimum and maximum values
of the value distribution. A modest fraction of bids (about 10%) are equal to the supports of the
distribution, mostly zero bids in the hybrid treatments. We treat these as censored observations in
the sense that individuals may justifiably choose to bid below (above) the lower (upper) support
in the absence of such constraints. For instance, overbidding is common in experimental uniform
price auctions, where the winning bidders do not set the price. Kagel and Levin [1993] discuss
one possible explanation for the overbidding—individuals may see it as strategic to bid above
their values as doing so increases the probability of winning, and in more cases than not the
realized uniform price lies below the over-bidder’s valuation. Also, as illustrated in Section II.A.,
some participants in some hybrid mechanism auctions may have optimal bids that are negative.
Given that individuals cannot officially withdraw from the auction, and that bids are constrained
to be non-negative, some zero bids may come from individuals who would have bid negative if
given the option. We account for the double-censored data, with individuals who participate in
20 auctions, using a random effects Tobit model (the random effect is participant-specific).15
Data from all treatments are pooled.

15

We also estimated standard random and fixed effects models that ignore the censoring. Random and fixed effects
estimates are similar to one another (Hausman Test: p=0.33), and all estimated slope coefficients have the same
sign, and are of similar magnitude and statistical significance when compared with the random effects Tobit. The
main difference is that the estimated intercept for the discriminative hybrid is no longer statistically significant in the
standard random effects model (these intercepts drop out of the fixed effects model due to perfect collinearity with
the fixed effects).
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Table 3 presents the estimated bid functions. 16 We report a measure of fit, Pseudo-R2, of
0.789, calculated as the squared correlation between the actual and the estimated conditional
mean for noncensored observations (see Dhrymes [1986]). The two main results, consistent with
Propositions 1 through 5, are that the lottery reduces bids and risk aversion increases bids. In
particular, the presence of the lottery, as measured by the probability of winning the lottery,
decreases the slope of the bid function for both formats. The effects are statistically significant at
the 1% level. We note that this effect is robust to inclusion/exclusion of variables related to our
risk measure. Further, at the 1% significance level, risk aversion (seeking) increases (decreases)
the slope of the bid function for both the uniform price and discriminative hybrid. Overall, there
appears to be merit in using an elicited risk preference measure in a subsequent experiment that
can be argued as being reasonably close in terms of the nature of the risk.
The slope of the uniform price bid function is not statistically different than one, indeed it
equals 0.99, suggesting a near perfect correlation between bids and value. Further, we
comfortably fail to reject the null joint hypothesis of unit slope and zero intercept [χ2(2
d.f.)=0.61, p=0.74]. Many experimental second-price auction studies find evidence of
overbidding. However, our results are similar to Garrat et al. [2005], who use participants known
to have substantial experience in eBay auctions. Three-fourths of our subjects report having
previous auction experience. Evaluated at the mean risk measure (Risk=0.85) and mean number
of auction units (Q=1.98), the slope of the discriminative auction bid function is 0.96, and is
statistically different from 1 [z=-2.39, p=0.02]. The intercept is equal to -0.57 and is not
statistically different from zero. Inconsistent with the theory, there is no statistically significant
effect of risk preference on the slope of the discriminative auction bid function. The number of
16

We initially estimated bid and revenue models that controlled for individual characteristics such as age, previous
experiment participation and previous auction participation. These effects are jointly equal to zero and omitted from
our final models.
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auction units also has no discernable effect. Although the auction-unit effect is peculiar, we have
no basis of empirical comparison as we know of no studies that vary the number of auction units
within session.
C.

Revenue

Our bidding analysis, as well as theory, suggests that we should expect lower revenue
from the hybrid allocation mechanisms. Tests of revenue data, however, are quite capable of
yielding results that differ from the tests of individual bidding (see Cox, Smith, and Walker
[1984]), and so we undertake an analysis of revenue that parallels our bidding analysis. As noted
by Tenorio [1993], although revenue hypotheses are stated in ex ante terms, empirical tests
commonly rely on ex post realizations. We follow a similar convention here.
The revenue functions presented in Section II.C have a similar form to equilibrium bid
functions. The revenue function for the uniform price auction and hybrid is the number of
auction units, Q, multiplied by the bid of the individual with the (N − Q ) highest value,
th

denoted v N −Q . Thus, for the uniform price auction the revenue function is simply Q × v N −Q . As
the probability of winning the lottery and risk preferences shift the slope of the bid function in
relation to value for all bidders, including the one with the (N − Q ) highest value, it follows
th

that these factors shift the revenue function in relation to Q × v N −Q . The revenue function for the
discriminative auction and discriminative hybrid is the sum of the top Q bids. As equilibrium bid
functions, for our parameters, are approximately linear functions of value, the revenue function
becomes approximately linear in relation to the sum of the top Q values,

N

∑v

j
j = N −Q +1

. Similar to how

the probability of winning the lottery and risk preferences change the slope of the bid function in
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relation to value, these factors shift the revenue function relative to

N

∑v

j
j = N −Q +1

.

An important consideration is how to include risk in an analysis of revenue, which
depends on the risk attitudes of several individuals. Theoretically, for homogeneous risk
preferences, those with the highest Q values are auction winners, and the individual with the Q+1
highest value sets the uniform price. As an approximation here, we assume that individuals with
the top Q+2 values are important in determining revenue. 17 We include measures of risk by
averaging over the individuals with the top Q+2 values. In contrast to session-specific averages,
the measures utilized here necessarily vary across the 20 auctions within a session.
Table 4 presents estimated revenue functions. The estimator is a standard random effects
model, rather than a random effects Tobit, as there is no obvious censoring issue, e.g., there are
no $0 revenue outcomes. The two main observations are that the probability of winning the
lottery has a negative and statistically significant effect on revenue for the discriminative hybrid
only, and there is no significant relationship between average risk and the revenue function of
either hybrid mechanism. Curious about this finding, we re-estimated our bid functions while
restricting the sample to those with high values. In doing so, we find that the risk effects do
likewise go away for the hybrid mechanisms, but the probability of winning the lottery remains
negative and statistically different from zero for both hybrid mechanisms. We fail to reject the
null hypothesis that all risk coefficients are jointly equal to zero [χ2(3)=2.25, p=0.52].
The estimated revenue function for the uniform price auction has a slope of 1.04 and an
intercept of 0.89. These parameters are jointly statistically different from the theoretical revenue
function which has unit slope and zero intercept [χ2(2)=24.45, p<0.01]. The actual difference is

17

This measure seems reasonable given that, as discussed later, the allocation mechanisms are highly efficient,
which means those with the highest values tend to be auction winners.
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small in magnitude, as estimated revenue is about 5% higher than predicted revenue. An
interesting finding is that the estimated uniform price hybrid revenue function is statistically
identical to that from the uniform price auction [χ2(2)=1.92, p=0.38]. Thus, although there are
very strong lottery effects on bidding behavior, these effects do not translate into lower revenues.
Turning to the discriminative auction, we find weak evidence that the discriminative
auction generates higher revenue than the uniform price auction. Note that the slopes of the two
revenue functions are not directly comparable since they are relative to different value measures.
Instead, we compare the two by comparing the estimated revenues based on the expected values
for Q × v N −Q and

N

∑v

j
j = N −Q +1

for the value distribution employed in the experiment (i.e., Uniform[0,

20]). Estimated revenue for the discriminative auction is $0.19 lower for Q=1 [z=-0.21, p=0.84],
$0.46 higher for Q=2 [z=0.53, p=0.59], and $3.11 higher for Q=3 [z=3.08, p<0.01].18 Our results
are thus approximately consistent with theory under the assumption of risk-neutrality. As
mentioned above the lottery serves to decrease discriminative auction revenues. For Q=2, for
instance, the model suggests that expected revenue decreases by $0.77 for each additional unit
allocated by lottery. Putting this into perspective, the expected difference in revenue based on the
theoretical revenue functions under risk neutral bidding is $2.87.
Although the discriminative auction revealed a slight revenue advantage over uniform
price, the advantage disappears in the hybrid setting due to insignificant lottery effects in the
uniform price hybrid. Evaluated at the means of the covariates, for seven of the nine Q, L
combinations employed in the experiment, revenues from the two hybrid mechanisms are not
statistically different. In one of the two cases of statistical difference {Q=3, L=1} the

18

Although the discussion here and in the remainder of this subsection suggests directional (i.e., one-sided)
alternative hypotheses, the p-values reported are for two-sided tests.

28

discriminative hybrid is higher by $2.27 and in the other {Q=2, L=3} the uniform price hybrid is
higher by $1.96. This (approximate) revenue equivalence is consistent with the theory under risk
neutral bidding. Although revenue differences for the hybrid mechanisms in the general case of
risk aversion depend on the form of the utility function, for CRRA expected revenue is higher for
the discriminative hybrid.
D.

Efficiency

Under certain assumptions, both the pure auction and the auction component of the
hybrid mechanisms we examine are theoretically efficient, in the sense that auction units accrue
to those with the highest valuations. No assumptions about risk preferences are needed for the
uniform price auction, but for the other allocation mechanisms efficiency depends upon
homogeneous risk preferences with risk neutrality as a special case. The analysis above suggests
some heterogeneity in risk preferences, although the revenue analysis suggests that the average
winning bidder bids as if risk neutral. We estimate the following efficiencies, defined as the
percentage of available economic surplus captured in the auction, which in this setting is simply
the sum of the values for winning bidders as a percentage of the sum of values for those with the
Qth highest valuations: uniform price auction = 95.69% (robust s.e. = 1.69); discriminative

auction = 97.78% (1.33); uniform price hybrid = 95.77% (1.09); discriminative hybrid = 97.52%
(0.08). Previous uniform price and discriminative auction experiments yield efficiencies in the
neighborhood of 90 to 100%, and our results are in agreement. Comparing like pure auction and
hybrid mechanisms, they are within a fraction of a percent. Hence, apparently no behavioral
anomalies render the auction mechanism inefficient with the addition of the subsequent lottery.

V.

Discussion
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Motivated by the increasing use of combined price and non-price instruments for
allocating publicly provided goods, this paper provides first insights on their theoretical and
empirical properties. In particular, we investigate “hybrid” mechanisms that allocate a portion of
available units via auction and the remainder through a random lottery. We consider multiple
unit uniform price and discriminative auction formats, for bidders with independent private
values, singleton demands, and homogeneous risk preferences.
Theoretically, the lottery serves as an opportunity cost of winning the good through the
auction, and thus reduces equilibrium auction bids and revenues relative to the no lottery case.
The lottery also introduces an additional source of risk, which serves to increase bids under risk
aversion relative to the risk neutral case. Thus, unlike Nash equilibrium bidding in the pure
uniform price auction, which is independent of risk attitudes, equilibrium bidding in the uniform
price hybrid mechanism varies with risk preferences. Under homogeneous risk preferences, the
auction components of the hybrid mechanisms remain efficient.
Results from laboratory experiments with induced values largely support the theoretical
propositions put forth. A departure from other auction studies that consider risk preferences, we
elicit individual bidder risk preferences from a separate lottery-choice experiment and use these
measures in our econometric estimation of bid functions. There appears to be merit in this more
direct approach, as the risk measure is statistically significant, and shifts the slope of the
empirical bid functions in the anticipated direction, for both hybrid mechanisms. One interesting
finding is that the risk measure does not correlate with bids for the pure discriminative auction,
and this adds to the debate on whether risk parameters estimated directly from auction data are
actually capturing risk preferences.
The auction component of the hybrid mechanism remains highly efficient in our
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experiments. However, our revenue analysis reveals that auction winners engage in different
bidding strategies in the process. In particular, we find that there no longer is a relationship
between risk preferences and revenue generation for either hybrid mechanism. For the uniform
price hybrid, this disparate bidding behavior from winners is even more pronounced as the
lottery has no discernable effect on auction revenues. An extended experimental design coupled
with a rich behavioral model may be able to provide valuable insight on observed bidding
patterns. This would appear to have import for auction behavior in other situations where auction
bidders have an outside but uncertain opportunity to obtain the good, such as when an auction
bidder can participate in a subsequent auction for the same good. We conclude the paper with
discussion of three other possible avenues for future research.
First, our theoretical results assume homogeneous risk preferences. In light of recent
empirical work that suggests important differences across individuals in risk preferences, a
useful extension of our work would be to allow for this. Allowing for heterogeneity in risk
preferences among bidders renders the auction component of both hybrid mechanisms
asymmetric and as such inefficient [Cox et al., 1982; Krishna, 2002]. That is, with heterogeneous
risk preferences, the hybrid auction-lottery mechanisms we examine no longer guarantee that
auction units go to bidders with the highest values. In terms of the discriminative hybrid, this is
an expected result since the discriminative auction is inefficient in general with asymmetric
bidders. In contrast, the pure uniform price auction is efficient under heterogeneous risk
preferences (i.e., equilibrium bid functions remain independent of risk preferences). However,
the addition of the lottery in the uniform price hybrid reverses this result. The intuition is
straightforward. Since risk aversion increases equilibrium bids in both hybrid mechanisms, in a
model with heterogeneous risk preferences, a risk-averse bidder with a lower value could outbid
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a risk-neutral bidder with a higher value.19
Second, our theoretical analysis and experimental design assume no entry or user fees for
the auction or lottery. However, as fees are in place in some of the example mechanisms we cite,
an exploration of their effects is a useful extension of our model. Here, we take preliminary steps
towards this goal by examining the effects of a user fee for lottery winners on auction
participation and equilibrium bids in the uniform price hybrid. Let τ denote a user fee for lottery
winners. The participation constraint with this modification becomes:
U (vi − bUH , A ) = pU (vi − τ ) + (1 − p )U (0 ) .

(19)

A comparison of equations (3) and (19) suggests that the presence of (or an increase in) the user
fee for lottery winners encourages participation in the auction. Similarly, for those values of
bUH , A for which the participation constraint holds, implicit differentiation of expression (19)

suggests that a higher user fee for lottery winners increases equilibrium bids in the uniform price
hybrid:
dbUH , A
dτ

=

pU ′(v − τ )
> 0.
U ′(v − bUH , A )

These results are intuitive as the presence of a user fee for lottery winners decreases the
opportunity cost of winning the auction. Similar comparisons allow an exploration of the impacts
of other factors, such as risk preferences, entry fees, and changes in the probability of winning
the lottery on the participation constraint and on equilibrium bidding behavior. An experimental
design that allows bidders to opt out of the auction component of the hybrid mechanism would
be a valuable complement to a theoretical exploration of these issues.
19

We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this result to our attention. When we allow for heterogeneous risk
preferences among bidders, the efficiency of the hybrid mechanisms depends on the distribution of values and the
distribution of risk preferences among bidders. A formal example for the uniform price hybrid under heterogeneous
CRRA preferences is developed in the appendix to illustrate the inefficiency of the uniform price hybrid mechanism
in this setting.
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A final related extension involves the optimal design of a hybrid mechanism. Some
important features include the optimal distribution of units between the auction and lottery, the
optimal user and/or entry fees, and the optimal order of the auction and lottery components of the
mechanism. Analysis of these issues requires an explicit model of the seller’s objective.
Although revenue maximization is the typical assumption, a revenue-maximizing seller would
not choose a hybrid mechanism. Therefore, as noted earlier, the use of such mechanisms
suggests the presence of more complex motives on the part of the seller. A political economy
model of the mechanism design problem facing the seller would allow an exploration of these
issues and represents an important extension to the results we present here.
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Table 1. Parameters and Results of Risk Elicitation Experiment

Decision
Task

Option A

1

Receive $3.00

Option B

CRRA coefficient
of relative risk
aversion (r)
–

Proportion of
Participants

0% chance of $5.00,
–
100% chance of $0.50
0
2
Receive $3.00
10% chance of $5.00,
[-∞, -3.508]
90% chance of $0.50
3
Receive $3.00
20% chance of $5.00,
[-3.507, -2.146]
0
80% chance of $0.50
4
Receive $3.00
30% chance of $5.00,
[-2.145, -1.336]
0.014
70% chance of $0.50
5
Receive $3.00
40% chance of $5.00,
[-1.335, -.742]
0.042
60% chance of $0.50
6
Receive $3.00
50% chance of $5.00,
[-.741, -.250]
0.104
50% chance of $0.50
7
Receive $3.00
60% chance of $5.00,
[-.249, .194]
0.229
40% chance of $0.50
8
Receive $3.00
70% chance of $5.00,
[.195, .631]
0.306
30% chance of $0.50
9
Receive $3.00
80% chance of $5.00,
[.632, 1.112]
0.174
20% chance of $0.50
10
Receive $3.00
90% chance of $5.00,
[1.113, 1.758]
0.097
10% chance of $0.50
0.035
11
Receive $3.00 100% chance of $5.00,
[1.759, ∞]
0% chance of $0.50
Notes: The risk coefficient corresponds to an individual that switches from the certain payoff
(Option A) and the uncertain payoff (Option B) at this task.
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Table 2. Equilibrium Bid Functions

Risk Neutral: U ( x ) = x

1− r
CRRA: U ( x) = x

Uniform Price
Auction

bU ,N = vi

bU ,CRRA = vi

Discriminative
Auction

bD , N = v

N − Q I vi v ( N − Q + 1, Q )
N
I vi v ( N − Q , Q )

[

bD ,CRRA = vi − v I vi
vi v

1− r

(N − Q, Q )]1−r ⋅
−1

v
1

∫ [I Y (N − Q, Q )]1−r dY
0

Uniform Price
Hybrid

⎛
S −Q ⎞
⎟⎟bU ,N
bUH ,N = ⎜⎜1 −
⎝ N −Q ⎠

bUH ,CRRA

Discriminative
Hybrid

⎛
S −Q ⎞
⎟⎟bD ,N
bDH ,N = ⎜⎜1 −
⎝ N −Q⎠

bDH ,CRRA

Γ( N )
Notes: I vi v ( N − Q, Q ) =
Γ( N − Q )Γ(Q )

vi v

∫y

N −Q −1

(1 − y )Q−1 dy

1
⎛
⎞
⎜ ⎛ S − Q ⎞ 1− r ⎟
⎟⎟ ⎟bU ,CRRA
= ⎜1 − ⎜⎜
⎜ ⎝ N −Q⎠ ⎟
⎝
⎠
1
⎛
⎞
⎜ ⎛ S − Q ⎞ 1− r ⎟
⎟⎟ ⎟bD ,CRRA
= ⎜1 − ⎜⎜
−
N
Q
⎝
⎠ ⎟
⎜
⎝
⎠

is the incomplete beta function.

0
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Table 3. Estimated Bid Functions (Random Effects Tobit)

Uniform Price

Uniform Price
Hybrid

Discriminative

Discriminative
Hybrid

Variable

Parameter

Intercept

α

0.373
(0.478)

-0.463
(0.477)

-0.572
(0.456)

-2.672**
(0.467)

Value

β

0.993**
(0.018)

0.993**
(0.018)

0.965**
(0.022)

0.965**
(0.022)

Value x Q

θ

0.005
(0.007)

0.005
(0.007)

⎛ S −Q ⎞
⎟⎟
Value x ⎜⎜
⎝ N −Q ⎠

λ

-0.232**
(0.074)

Value x Risk

γ

0.038**
(0.013)

-0.299**
(0.083)
-0.014
(0.012)

0.024**
(0.010)

Log-L
Pseudo-R2

-18806.349
0.789
2880
N
Notes: A participant-specific random effect is assumed. Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** denotes coefficient is statistically
different from zero at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4. Estimated Revenue Functions (Random Effects Model)

Uniform Price

Uniform Price
Hybrid

Discriminative

Discriminative
Hybrid

Intercept

0.890
(0.969)

-0.807
(0.942)

2.047*
(0.854)

0.572
(0.838)

~
v

1.039**
(0.023)

1.039**
(0.023)

0.878**
(0.021)

0.878**
(0.021)

Variable

⎛ S −Q ⎞
~
⎟⎟
v x ⎜⎜
⎝ N −Q ⎠

0.078
(0.088)

~
v x Risk (average)

-0.024
(0.018)

-0.209*
(0.089)
-0.006
(0.016)

-0.008
(0.013)

χ2(10 d.f.)
R2

5407.30
0.958
240
N
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** denotes coefficient is statistically different than zero at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
For uniform price and discriminative treatments, ~
v = Q v N −Q and ~
v=

N

∑v

j
j = N −Q +1

, respectively.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium Bid Functions: Lottery Effects
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Figure 2. Equilibrium Bid Functions: Risk Effects
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